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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Rosalyn Higgins
Ladies and Gentlemen: In this regional meeting of the American Society of International Law, held in conjunction with the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, we have chosen the theme of Diverging AngloAmerican Attitudes to InternationalLaw. This is, in a sense, a curiously
untopical theme for a regional meeting, when such current issues as, for
example, hijacking, pollution, or the deep sea bed are available to us. I
do not understand the importance of these and comparable issues; nor
do I denigrate the frequent custom in regional meetings of looking at a
burning contemporary topic. But the deliberate selection of this theme
rather emphasizes that there is an even more important, longer-term
theme deserving of discussion-namely the extent to which AngloAmerican attitudes to international law are diverging.
The positions we take on any particular subject-whether the legal
aspects of Vietnam or of pollution--depend in large part upon our basic
approach to international law. It may therefore be useful, for once, to
discuss the underlying approaches rather than the controversial topics
themselves. There seems to me to be ample evidence that the time has
come to examine these basic approaches-and indeed, that until we do,
much of our discussion of the specifics of international law is going to
be unfruitful.
The very title of this meeting is based on a premise which I appreciate
is arguable-namely, that such differences as we can detect in our basic
approaches to international law are in large part differences between
American views, on the one hand, and British views on the other. C.
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Wilfred Jenks, in his recent and as yet unpublished Maccabean Lecture
on Jurisprudence,' has doubts about this proposition. He appears to
think that although there is an element of truth in it, it is premature to
perceive a rift of any magnitude; and that indeed, the very stating of such
a divergence is perhaps to encourage the appearance of a rift. I am with
Dr. Jenks all the way in urging bridge-building, but think that first we
must identify and recognize the chasm which we are seeking to repair.
To be sure, the fundamentally different attitudes which are held about
international law are not simply differences between the Americans and
the British. Of course monolithic views are not held in either place.
Fierce debate is to be heard within the United States on what one might
term the jurisprudence of international law; and though the debate is
more muted in Britain, it exists, and varying views are expressed. And
because views are not monolithic either side of the Atlantic, there will
who seem, both to themselves
be certain British and American lawyers
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I nonetheless think that certain broad generalizations are valid, and
that these perhaps might serve as a focus for our discussions today.
(I) I think, first, that in the United States there is a greater conscious
concern with the question of different approaches to international law;
whereas in England an instinctive preference for pragmatism over doctrine frequently masks the intellectual premises on which legal views are
based.
(2) 1 believe that in England international law is still seen primarily
as being concerned with rules, and with neutral rules at that. In the
United States, however, the concern with rules is less central, and more
emphasis is given to law as a process, as an aspect of decision-making,
a communication.
(3) It follows from this that in the United States there is a readily
accepted relationship between law and policy. In England, by contrast,
there is a profound mistrust of the injection of policy considerations into
international law. If our American colleagues believe that international
law is a tool of social engineering, ours to build with, the British prefer
to emphasize its neutrality in respect of social values, and further suggest
that policy rapidly becomes indistinguishable from politics. The intro'The lecture, entitled "Orthodoxy and Innovation in the Law of Nations," was delivered by Dr.
Jenks in London on May 12, 1971.
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Such perceptions were later to be evident in the papers delivered by Professor D.H.N. Johnson
and Mr. Henry Darwin. In some cases, however, I think the British perception of common ground
is not always shared by their American colleagues.
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duction of policy considerations, many British would argue, makes international law unscientific and unpredictable. They urge that neutral
rules are the protection of the weak against the strong; that the acknowledgment of policy considerations introduces a subjective element; and
that the outcome will be an even greater reluctance by states to use the
international legal process.' The place of policy in international law is,
of course, the subject matter of our first panel and we are likely to have
four excellent statements from different positions along the spectrum. I
will leave it to you to identify the conservatives, the moderates, and the
radicals.
(4) Method and style are a further important cause of dissent between
Britain and America. In the United States there has been a considerable
acceptance of the relevance of the social sciences to international law;
and this in turn has led to the use of language or-to use a more valueladen term-jargon, which is as unfamiliar to the British lawyer as is
legal jargon to the proverbial man in the street. In Britain I do not
believe that international law is integrated with the social sciences to
anything like the same degree, and I think there is a widespread bafflement, skepticism, and finally resentment about the language barrier that
this is seen to represent.
Now all of the above statements can be qualified in some way or other.
As I have said, there is no monolithic view of international law on either
side of the Atlantic. The New Haven approach is very different from that
of Harvard or Columbia; and the intellectual foundations of the views
of, for example, Dr. Jenks are not the same as those of Judge Fitzmaurice. And yet I think that what I have said fairly represents the
mainstream of thinking in each country; and no one who has had the
pleasure of attending international conferences with a mixed BritishAmerican participation can fail to be aware of this fundamental gap in
attitudes and language to which I have been referring.
The panel topics today have been chosen to highlight these important
underlying questions of attitude, though I believe that each of them
represents a fascinating theme in itself. We have panelists of the highest
caliber to make statements on the place of policy; the reach of extraterritorial jurisdiction; the role of the International Court of Justice; the
functions of the government legal adviser; and teaching methods in international law. And in each case, the presentations, which will deliberately
'These three points, interestingly, were later made in two British papers: the first by Professor
R.Y. Jennings and the second and third by Professor D.H.N. Johnson.
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be fairly brief and informal, will be followed by discussion from the
floor.
So I wish to elaborate no further on this brief introductory statement,
but to let you hear our panelists. It remains for me to say that the Royal
Institute of International Affairs with its longstanding interest in international law and organization, is delighted to have the opportunity to
host a regional meeting of the American Society of International Law.

